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Introduction: Data and Inference in Descriptive Questions about World Politics  
Many of the central questions of interest to researchers and a general audience about World 
Politics are inherently descriptive. Some prominent examples include: Has there been a 
decline in conflict in the international system? Was the 19th century more peaceful than the 
20th century? How common are democratic institutions around the world, and how has the 
extent of democracy changed over time? Does there appear to be any relationship between 
such changes or “waves of democracy” and conflict in the international system? 
Descriptive questions like these should in principle be answerable from empirical data 
or information about the relevant features. The turn to greater use of scientific methods in the 
study of international relations, exemplified by the Scientific Study of International Processes 
section of the International Studies Association, is premised on how attention to the canons of 
scientific inquiry, systematic data collection, and empirical testing of propositions can help 
improve our understanding of World Politics. Following the behavioral revolution in the 
social sciences in the 1960s, we have indeed seen the development of several databases that 
attempt to take stock of core features relevant to international relations such as conflict 
between states and democratic institutions. Given the development of such data sources, one 
might expect that answering the questions posed above should be relatively straightforward, 
and that we could reach clear and uncontroversial answers to these questions simply by 
looking at the data at hand. 
The development of data on characteristics relevant to the study of international 
relations has undeniably allowed a great deal of progress to be made on many research 
questions. However, trying to answer seemingly simple descriptive questions such as those 
posed above will often alert us to how data rarely speak entirely for themselves. The specific 
ways in which we pose questions or try to reach answers will often influence our conclusions. 
Likewise, the specific manner in which the data have been collected will often have 
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implications for our inferences. answer to core descriptive questions such as those outlined 
above will often end up being contested by other researchers. Many empirical debates in the 
study of international relations, upon closer inspection, often hinge on assumptions and 
criteria that are not made fully explicit in studies based on empirical data. In this chapter, we 
try to clarify some of the central issues and survey how key problems in international data 
collection and their interpretation can affect our efforts to answer key descriptive questions 
about war and peace in the world and its relationship to other features of interest.  
 
A Case Study: Conflict after the Cold War 
To use a specific example for illustration, consider the issue of how common conflict is in the 
world and whether there are any discernable trends in the frequency of conflict over time. 
Many prominent scholars had originally predicted that the end of the Cold War would unleash 
a period of instability with a heightened risk of new conflicts (see, e.g., Mearsheimer 1990 for 
a particularly pessimistic view; Mueller 1994 provides an interesting review of such 
predictions). However, an early empirical analysis of the so-called Uppsala Armed Conflict 
Data (ACD) project collecting information on conflict incidence for the years 1989–94 
actually indicated that there appeared to be a decline in new conflicts and fewer ongoing 
conflicts in the world after the Cold War (see Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995). This finding 
of a so-called post-Cold War dip in the frequency of armed conflict has later been replicated 
by other researchers, including researchers using different data sources on conflict incidence 
(Gurr 2000), and has gradually become accepted among many conflict researchers (see, e.g., 
Mueller 2004). The post-Cold War dip in conflict also provides a rare example of an 
 2
empirical finding that has managed to get disseminated beyond the confines of academia and 
conflict studies (see Goldstein 2002; Mack 2002).1  
This decline in the number of conflicts noted in the Uppsala data is undoubtedly an 
empirical finding, which can be derived directly from these data by simply counting the 
number of conflicts assigned proper names. However, other researchers have disputed the 
existence of such a post-Cold War dip in conflict, seemingly also basing their conclusions on 
empirical evidence and data.2 Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer (2003), for example, focusing on 
the number of casualties in conflicts (from another data source) rather than the number of 
conflicts, argue that data on conflict “reflect a disquieting constancy in warfare” (p. 49) over 
the past one hundred and fifty years. Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr (2007) noted that the 
number of countries participating in armed conflict had not fallen to the same extent, and 
questioned the significance in the observed decline in the number of conflicts if present 
conflicts were particularly extensive in scope measured by number of participants. 
 
1 An early op-ed piece in the Los Angeles Times on this phenomenon (Wilson III and Gurr 1999) is rumored to 
have caught the attention of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan and in turn spurred the initiative for 
the subsequent Human Security Report (2005). The publication of the HSR and its discussion of the post Cold 
War dip in conflict and its possible causes gave rise to a large number of op-ed pieces in newspapers worldwide. 
2 The idea of a post-Cold War decline in conflict has also met skepticism from commentators in the popular 
media (see, e.g., Kaplan 2006). Many argue that “new wars” and forms of violence such as terrorism and 
genocide have replaced traditional forms interstate conflict (Kaldor 2006). Although such claims are rarely 
supported using systematic data, this is a potentially valid objection since most existing conflict data require that 
a state must be one of the actors and require all parties to be a cohesive group to be counted (see, e.g., Gleditsch 
et al. 2002; Sambanis 2004; Small and Singer 1982). Hence, they would not include other forms of violence and 
may be inappropriate to consider such displacement effects. However, systematic studies using other data lend 
no support to claims that genocide and terrorism have become more widespread or severe over time (e.g., 
Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007; Kalyvas 2001; Rummel 1995) 
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The fact that researchers draw such different conclusions about what would seem a 
simple descriptive question about the extent of conflict is bound to seem puzzling to many 
observers. Upon closer inspection it is possible to find that the conclusions in these studies 
depend on some obvious differences in research design as well as some more subtle 
differences in assumptions about how to analyze the available data and the specific manner in 
which these data have been collected. In this particular case, the evidence for the dip in 
violence in Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1995) is based on counting the number of unique 
conflicts in the ACD data. By contrast, the Sarkees et al. argument about the alarming 
constancy of war is based on the absence of a clear linear trend in a regression of fatalities 
from conflict on time, whereas Hewitt et al.’s measure does not decline as fast as the number 
of conflicts since many international interventions in recent conflicts such as Kosovo and 
Afghanistan have involved large international coalitions. These are very different types of 
data and measures of the frequency/severity of conflict, and there is no inherent reason why 
studies using different criteria should need to yield similar conclusions about how common 
conflict is in the world. 
This short case study should impress upon us how many answers to seemingly 
descriptive question almost inevitably require a number of important additional assumptions, 
and how it rarely will be possible to simply directly look at available data and reach answers 
that will be universally accepted as valid. Our argument here is not that it is inherently 
impossible to answer such questions, or that all approaches are arbitrary and equally valid 
ways of answering a question. We may certainly legitimately question whether it is 
reasonable to use the number of participants by very inclusive criteria, including UN 
operations, as a measure of the scope of conflict3 and whether fitting a linear time trend is a 
 
3 For example, based on the number of participants in the “coalition of the willing” (36), the Iraq War is “larger” 
than World War I (32) (see Gleditsch 2008). By most other scale criteria (but not duration), it is much smaller. 
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good way to examine variation in the severity of conflict over time.4 However, there may not 
be any natural or inherently valid empirical measures, and debates on such questions must 
clarify the potentially contentious issues in collecting and analyzing data. Researchers must be 
as explicit as possible about the assumptions entailed in their answers and be prepared to 
defend these before we can meaningfully evaluate differences in their conclusions and their 
validity. 
 
Core Issues in Data Collection 
We will by necessity have to be somewhat selective in the specific issues that we can cover in 
this Chapter, and we will focus on problems of collecting data on core features that lie at the 
heart of the discipline, such as how to identify states and conflict between them. However, 
many of the issues that we discuss are rather general and likely to be relevant for a wider 
range of data collection projects and research questions in International Relations. 
Before we turn to the specifics of particular data collection efforts, it will be helpful to 
introduce some general criteria and objectives that we would wish data collections to achieve 
or approach as far as possible. In general, we would prefer data to be collected in a manner 
that maximizes content validity and objectivity. Empirical measures have content validity to 
the extent that the resulting observable indicators reflect the theoretical concepts that 
researchers are interested in (see Campbell and Stanley 1963). One way to think of objectivity 
here is as the degree to which the explicit operational definition can be applied in an 
intersubjective manner.5 Data become more subjective if two researchers may disagree on 
 
4 Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett (2006) challenge the conclusions of Sarkees et al. (2003), as well as their data. 
They argue that a curvilinear specification suggests a clear declining level of fatalities of conflict after 1945. 
5 See, e.g., Vanhanen (1990) and Bollen (1990) for a discussion of objective and subjective measures and 
indicators in the study of democracy.  
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how individual observations should be classified or how the criteria should be applied to 
actual cases. Moreover, we would want our data to be as valid as possible for allowing 
comparisons between individual observations or countries and over time (e.g., King et al. 
2003; Summers and Heston 1988). Stated differently, we should be concerned if our data 
produce relative measures or rankings of observations that fail obvious construct validity tests 
for a given time slice, or use operational criteria that change over time in ways that may 
influence our conclusions. The goals of objectivity and content validity can sometimes present 
very real tradeoffs in data collection efforts. Coding schemes that might be difficult to apply 
in an intersubjective manner, such as the definition of a state based on relative autonomy or 
the definition of a crisis based on perception of threat, are often designed to increase the 
content validity and maximize the ability to draw meaningful comparisons across units. That 
is, apparent ease of coding consistency is not of much help in itself unless the measures 
correspond well to the underlying theoretical constructs. When choosing coding rules, one 
must try to maximize both objectivity and content validity, even though it may be difficult to 
fully preserve both at the same time. 
Finally, just as important as potential problem in data collection are the problems 
arising from unobservable or non-random missing data in comparisons (Rubin 1976) and 
what we call “denominator effects” (Dixon and Boswell 1996; Firebaugh 1992). In particular, 
we should be very skeptical of descriptive claims if there are likely to be major problems with 
observing the phenomenon of interest in particular circumstances, or if descriptive claims are 
based on shares or proportions where the denominator may leave out important relevant actors 
or individuals. We will return to these issues in the specific applications that we discuss.  
 
The units: How many states or actors? 
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Identifying the set of the relevant actors or units in the field could be seen as the most 
fundamental issue in collecting International Relations data. The traditional approach in 
International Relations theory is to take the state as the key actor or fundamental unit. Hence, 
to answer questions about the relative frequency of wars between states, we clearly need to 
first identify the population of states that might enter into conflict with one another.  
The literature on the state offers a number of conceptual definitions. An early 
influential example is Weber’s (2004[1918]) definition of the state as “a relation of men 
dominating men” with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. More recently North 
(1981: 21) defines the state as “an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, 
extending over a geographic areas whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax 
constituents”. Krasner’s (1995/6) discussion of the possible changing and variable nature of 
the state highlights territoriality and autonomy as the defining characteristics of the 
Westphalian state. 
Such efforts to develop conceptual definitions of the state rarely discuss how one 
might operationalize these defining characteristics in practice. The probably best-known effort 
to identify states in the international system empirically is the so-called Correlates of War list, 
first developed by Russett, Singer, and Small (1968). This list does not follow definitions of 
the state in emphasizing features such as territorial control and autonomy, but rather focuses 
on a set of criteria based on external recognition and a minimum population size, where the 
specific criteria for identifying states change over time. In brief, prior to 1920, the criteria for 
inclusion are i) recognition as a state by the UK and France and ii) a half a million minimum 
population threshold prior to 1920. After 1920, units are considered states if a) they are 
members in the League of Nations or the United Nations, or b) they exceed the half-million 
population threshold.  
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Whether this is a valid approach to identifying states depends upon the specific 
research question. Gleditsch and Ward (1999) criticize the content validity of the COW list 
criteria, since their operational definitions exclude a number of important autonomous actors 
with clear autonomy and territoriality in the 19th century when these were not recognized by 
either the UK or France. Moreover, the fact that different criteria are used over time means 
comparisons across time based on the COW list may be of questionable validity. Examples of 
questionable exclusions includes China and Iran, which were never colonized by any other 
state, as well as countries that were de facto autonomous in internal affairs but chose to let 
another state retain influence over foreign policy, such as the former British dominions 
Australia and Canada until after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Lemke (2002) notes that the 
COW list excludes many regionally important actors; In particular, many Latin American 
states appear in the COW list substantially later than their conventionally recognized dates of 
independence. More recently, the COW list has come to encompass a number of microscopic 
states, by virtue of UN membership, such as Palau (population 18,100), whose role as actors 
in world politics is somewhat questionable.  
Gleditsch and Ward (1999) suggest alternative criteria that emphasize autonomy and 
territorial control rather than major power recognition, which may be more appropriate for 
researchers interested in making statements about independent states than the major power 
centered conception of the international system guiding the construction of the COW list. As 
can be seen from Figure 1, the Gleditsch and Ward data yield a substantially larger number of 
states in the 19th century than the COW list, and a lower number of states following the rush 
of many microstates to join the UN in the 1990s. Especially during the 19th century, the COW 
list leaves large parts of the globe excluded from population. As a consequence, it follows that 
any measure based on the number of states in the denominator could differ considerably 
depending on the definitions used. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of population of states, Gleditsch & Ward and COW lists.  
 
Bremer and Ghosn (2003) criticize Gleditsch and Ward for relying on subjective 
criteria to identify states. Using the language introduced above, the costs of seemingly more 
subjective criteria that may be difficult to apply in an intersubjective manner must considered 
relative to the potential problems of content validity of alternative criteria that may appear 
more objective. External recognition can reflect political considerations as much as whether 
states have the characteristics that we expect states to have such as autonomy or territorial 
control. Objections from particular states can for example delay or prevent recognition by 
international organizations. This aside, even if the seemingly objective nature of the criteria 
might seem an attractive feature of the COW list, the stated rules are not actually sufficient to 
replicate the list. Gleditsch and Ward (1999) point out how Singer and Small excluded a 
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number of states that met their pre-1920 criteria and included others that did not, based on 
various ad-hoc decisions outside the explicit criteria. Ukraine and Belarus, for example, were 
independent UN members during the Cold War and signatories to the original UN charter, yet 
neither was considered a system member in the COW list.6 
 
Identifying Conflict between States  
In this section, we focus on how differences in definitions of conflicts used in various conflict 
data collection efforts will influence our inferences on trends in conflict and peace. As we 
have already mentioned, our decisions about what to consider a state will have obvious 
implications for our conclusions about conflicts between them. Gleditsch (2004b) identifies 
22 additional wars between states in the Gleditsch and Ward list that satisfy the COW 
project’s criteria for what constitutes an interstate war, but which were excluded from their 
data because at least one of the states involved was not recognized as a system member. 
However, since most efforts to collect data on conflict tend to use a particular definition of the 
population of states, it is generally difficult to ascertain how changing the criteria for states 
might influence our conclusions.  
Before we can make any inferences about trends, we obviously need to define what we 
mean by conflict and peace. Here again, we have a rich conceptual literature offering many 
definitions (see, e.g., the extensive review in Most and Starr 1989). Boulding (1963: 5), for 
example, proposes that conflict can be defined “as a situation of competition …[where] 
parties are aware of the incompatibility of their potential future position and … [each] wishes 
to occupy a position that is incompatible with the position of the other.” The emphasis on 
 
6 Gleditsch and Ward do not include these states as their independence from the Soviet Union is judged to be 
questionable (or largely fictitious). More generally, the COW list relies on similar subjective judgements 
supplementing or modifying the explicit operational criteria.  
 10
perceived conflict here allows us to exclude alleged forms of conflict that may not be 
understood by the actors, such as structural violence or certain forms of Marxist exploitation 
(Høivik and Galtung 1971; Roemer 1982). However, it is still far from clear how one would 
apply Boulding’s definition in efforts to collect empirical data (see, e.g., Gleditsch 2002). 
Despite the emphasis on incompatibilities as the defining characteristics in most 
conceptual definitions, most empirical conflict data collection efforts emphasize manifest 
forms of conflict or events involving the use of violence or perceived crisis. Incompatibilities 
may be enduring and take on the character of constant or regular features of relations – Spain, 
for example, continues to dispute UK sovereignty over Gibraltar, although it no longer acts in 
ways designed to enforce its claims. It would be nearly impossible to make an exhaustive 
catalogue over all such latent incompatibilities.7 By contrast, violent events and spectacular 
crises that are clearly departures from normal relations are much easier to observe and 
catalogue. 
The first data collection efforts on conflict emphasized the use of violence as a 
distinguishing characteristic of events,8 and this approach was later adopted by the Correlates 
of War project (Singer and Small 1972). The COW project in essence defined wars to be 
events causing more than 1,000 casualties and provided data for the period following the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814–15. The COW war definition has the advantage of separating 
wars or large events from minor controversies or quibbles. Moreover, the core definition 
appears – perhaps deceptively – simple and easy to apply. Upon closer inspection, however, 
many ambiguities arise with regards to how one would identify wars from this definition. 
 
7 The Issue Correlates of War project (see http://www.icow.org) has started collecting data on claims to 
territorial or environmental resources, but their work remains quite limited geographically and temporally given 
the scope of this task. 
8 See in particular Richardson’s (1960) Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. 
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Should one count deaths of active combatants or formal government soldiers, or should we 
include battledeaths by civilians? How do we determine if deaths were directly caused by 
conflict? How do we identify the start and end dates of a conflict? There has been 
considerable confusion over the specific operational criteria for identifying wars in the COW 
project, fueled in part by how the criteria have changed over time and doubt as to whether the 
criteria have been applied consistently over time (Gleditsch 2004b; Sambanis 2004). 
Moreover, although deaths in principle can be counted, determining whether the death 
threshold has been met involves relying on estimates of battledeaths, which in practice vary 
widely for many conflicts (see Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The paucity of information on 
many parts of the world and time periods implies that the quality of data on casualties is likely 
to be very low for many violent incidents (see Shirkey and Weisiger 2007). Hence, despite the 
apparent objective nature of the criteria, the resulting list of wars encompasses many 
subjective judgments, and it would be difficult – if at all possible – to replicate the list without 
additional information on the sources and subjective estimates used.  
Although a large number of studies have analyzed the incidence of war, many scholars 
have become concerned that looking only at the conflicts that eventually escalate to major 
wars may leave out much of the relevant conflictual situations and limit empirical variation 
that might help us better understand conflict and peace. Large wars are, fortunately, relatively 
uncommon events (Richardson 1948), and many argue that we can get a better understanding 
of under what conditions incompatibilities may escalate to violence if we take a more 
comprehensive look at crises and disputes between states from which war could arise.9 
 
9 The fact that conflicts display a scale-invariant distribution where frequency is inversely proportional to 
magnitude could also be taken to suggest that small and large wars represent draws from the same underlying 
distribution where the events that give rise to large wars may not be inherently different from smaller conflicts 
(see, e.g., Cederman 2003; Richardson 1948). The issue of whether large wars could be understood within 
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Three alternative data collection efforts have tried to identify such broader sets of 
conflicts. The Uppsala Armed Conflict Data (ACD) project retains the focus on violence and 
identifies “armed conflicts”, where we see “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths …[of which one must be] the government of a state” (Gleditsch 
et al. 2002: 618-9). However, other data collection efforts have dropped the explicit emphasis 
on violence, and instead looked for criteria to help identify situations where violence may be 
likely. The Correlates of War project has produced a dataset on Militarized Interstate Disputes 
(MIDs), defined as “cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by 
one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, 
official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996: 168). 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997; 1988) have developed a dataset of international crises – the 
Interstate Crisis Behavior Data (ICB) – defined by a set of necessary criteria that together are 
sufficient: 1) “a threat to one or more basic values,” 2) “an awareness of finite time for 
response, and 3) “a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities” (Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld 1997: 7).10 
Although these data collection efforts certainly are very useful and commendable, the 
expanded scope of these efforts introduces additional potential problems to those that we have 
previously listed. If there is a problem in identifying major wars in information poor 
                                                                                                                                                        
general theories or require special explanations is debated in a special issue edited by Midlarsky (1990). Hegre 
and Sambanis (2006) find differences among robust predictors for conflicts based on different conflict 
thresholds. 
10 Note that the ICB definition of crisis requires a judgment on whether or not the actors perceived a threat, finite 
time for response and heightened probability of military escalation. Hence, to determine what events constitute 
crises, coders must consider primary and secondary accounts of both the tangible actions transpired as well as 
how actors interpreted those actions. 
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environments as one goes back in time, then there is all the more reason to worry about 
whether we have sufficiently good historical data to identify such militarized interstate 
disputes and threats that may not entail any violence or casualties consistently in developing 
countries and in the 19th century. Gleditsch (2002: 000) notes that a disproportionate number 
of MIDs is reported for European states. Although this conceivably could be a “genuine” 
characteristic of the universe of militarized disputes, it seems more likely to arise in part as a 
result of more frequent reporting of events in this region and that many actual disputes that 
meet the definition simply go undetected in areas off the radar of international media. 
Moreover, the criteria for determining whether incidents are part of the “same” dispute or 
separate disputes in the MID data are complex. While wars such as the World Wars and the 
Mexican American War are considered one event with a single dispute ID, other contentious 
issues such as the Iranian threat to impose a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz give rise to a 
large number of disputes with distinct ID numbers.11 
 
 
Individuals in the COW project have often criticized the ICB data for relying on 
subjective evaluations of the perceptions of actors in identifying crises. However, it is highly 
 
11 The criteria for how incidents – the building blocks in the MID data – are aggregated into disputes are quite 
complex, and we refer to Jones et al. (1996 174-7) for the stated rules. In essence, the key criteria for 
determining whether individual incidents are part of an ongoing dispute hinge on a combination of whether 
incidents are seen as involving the “same” incompatibility, the time between evidence, whether there is evidence 
of coordination between parties, and whether an incident resulted in a formal treaty. Obviously, such decisions 
require considerable subjective judgment, and decisions are difficult to evaluate as the underlying incident data 
for the pre-1993 MID data are not publicly available (Glenn Palmer, personal communication). See also 
Fordham and Sarver (2001) for an insightful discussion of the MID criteria and possible problems for the study 
of US resort to force. 
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questionable whether one avoids the problem of subjective judgments by relying on 
secondary news report to identify disputes, as does the MID project, as these obviously also 
may reflect subjective perceptions or contentious views. Thompson (1995) similarly criticizes 
the content validity of rivalry measures based on the frequency of MIDs (see, e.g., Diehl and 
Goertz 2000), as these often include states that did not perceive one another as rivals and may 
omit rivals that did not record the required number of disputes.  
 
 
Figure 2: Number of ongoing interstate conflicts in the ACD, MID, and ICB data 
 
Our brief overview of the definitions of the different conflict measures indicates that the 
different conflict data have quite different criteria for what constitutes a conflictual event. 
Each of these will in turn give quite different indications of the prevalence of conflict in the 
international system. Figure 2 displays the number of ongoing conflicts in each year, from 
1946 to 2001, according to each of the datasets. As is evident, the MID data consistently 
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suggest far more conflictual events between states in each year than the other two data 
sources. Moreover, using the MID data as our guide we probably would not conclude that 
there was any decline in interstate war over time or a post-Cold War dip. Although the 
number of MIDs falls sharply at the end of the Cold War, this fall is preceded by an all-time 
high peak, and the number of MIDs quickly reverts back again to a level quite similar to the 
historical average. The ICB data suggest a much more restricted number of conflictual 
interstate events than the MID data. The ICB data do suggest a decline in conflict, but this 
here appears much earlier than the end of the Cold War and resembles a constant decline from 
the late 1980s, possibly as a result of improving relations between the Soviet Union in the 
West. When looking at interstate conflict only, the ACD data do not suggest much of a trend 
in Figure 2. However, this really reflects the sparsity of violent interstate armed conflict at any 
time during this period; hence the line hence appears almost entirely flat.12 
These are all quite different conceptualizations of conflict, and as we have mentioned 
previously, there is no reason why different data necessarily should yield similar answers or 
trends. However, it is incumbent upon researchers to ensure that the conflict measure used 
actually corresponds to the concept of interest. Any threshold criteria will always to some 
extent be arbitrary and judgment is required in determining what counts as a particular type of 
conflict and what does not. For example, the “use of force category” in the MID data includes 
fishing disputes, and analysts should think carefully about whether a confrontation between 
the US and Canada set off by a fishing vessel on one side and the Coast Guard on the other is 
 
12 An analysis of the ACD data that includes intrastate actors reveals many more conflicts and variation over 
time. 
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as relevant in the study of crisis dynamics as rapidly escalating and potentially very damaging 
conflicts such as the one between India and Pakistan in 2001.13  
A final problem in identifying conflict between states arises from its relationship to 
conflict within states. Civil wars, or conflict within states, is by far more common than 
conflicts between states (see Gleditsch et al. 2002; Holsti 1996). However, whereas many 
conflict data collection efforts impose typologies where there is a mutually exclusive 
distinction between intra- and inter-state wars, many conflictual events do not fit easily into 
these categories. Imposing such binary distinctions has led to numerous ambiguities in many 
data sources. In the Correlates of War data, for example, the civil war in Vietnam formally 
“ends” on 6 February 1965 when the US started the bombing of North Vietnam and the 
conflict was reclassified as an interstate war. And the Kashmir conflict has shifted back and 
forth between the civil and interstate war categories in different versions of the dataset, since 
a conflict by definition must be one of the two types.14 Similar issues arise in event-based data 
collections, and a large share of the recoded MIDs between states appear to originate out of 
civil conflicts rather than having interstate incompatibilities as their initial cause (see 
Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008). Although prior typologies and taxonomies can be 
helpful in data collection and theory building, these should not be allowed to become shackles 
that we strive to impose on our data if the observations refuse to behave according to our 
coding scheme. If a high share of disputes arise out of civil wars, then it seems questionable 
whether models focusing exclusively on state-to-state relations can realistically be expected to 
 
13 Incidentally, if the Kargil conflict is a major war, then this would be the only case of direct war between two 
nuclear counties. 
14 The Uppsala ACD data are an exception here, as they code conflicts by actors, so that one named conflict may 
include both state vs. state and state vs. non-state actor dyads. It is still possible to compute separate time-series 
for interstate and intrastate conflicts, but the starting-point is a joint list.  
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have high predictive capacity or include the relevant “issues” that may lead to conflict (see 
Diehl 1992; Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008).  
 
Denominator effects in International Relations Research  
In this section, we highlight how the answers that researchers reach may depend on what we 
call “denominator effects” in the construction of seemingly descriptive measures from the 
data. 
We start by the issue of the relationship between the distribution of capabilities in the 
system and its sensitivity to the list of states in the system. Traditional international relations 
theory has emphasized the distribution of military capabilities as a key determinant for the 
prospects for conflict and peace. A central debate has been the relative merits of different 
forms of systemic polarity or balance of power, or the pacifying effects of power 
preponderance (e.g., Kaplan 1957; Waltz 1979). Hence, it is not surprising that initial 
empirical efforts in conflict studies sought to evaluate such systemic capability concentration 
arguments empirically. An early example here is Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), who 
examine the relationship between a measure of systemic concentration and the extent of war 
in the international system. Their proposed measure of systemic concentration is 
2 1/
1 1/
is nCON
n
−= −
∑ , where is  indicates the proportion or share of capabilities held by a 
state in a system, while conflict is measured in terms of the number of nation-months of war 
during each year. The results in Singer et al. (1972) suggested that war was less common the 
more dispersed capabilities were in the 19th century, which they saw as consistent with the 
idea of balancing favoring peace. However, greater concentration was associated with peace 
in the 20th century, supporting the notion that preponderance favors peace. Singer et al. (1972) 
argue, in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, that changes in the nature of diplomacy may account for 
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the shift between the two time periods, due to the increasing uncertainty resulting from a 
larger role for domestic politics in the 20th century.  
The Singer et al. (1972) findings have been subject to a great deal of debate, and it is 
certainly possible to question the correspondence between their measure of power 
concentration and the concept of balance of power as well as the adequacy of their measures 
of conflict.15 Here, we wish to draw attention to how the differences in the definition of states 
across time can create problems for studies of this type. The CON measure is normalized by 
the number of states n and will be sensitive to changes in the number of states. This is due 
both to the presence of n  itself in the formula for CON as well as from the fact that the 
proportional size is  of a given amount capabilities that a state i holds must depend on the 
number of states in the system, since proportions are normalized so that 1is ≡∑ . By 
implication, a fixed level of capabilities for two states could coincide with changing systemic 
proportions simply because more states appear in the system and add to the denominator. As 
we mentioned above, measures based on shares of states will be difficult to compare across 
shifts in the COW criteria identifying the population of states. Although Singer et al. (1972) 
look only at major powers, the amount of warfare in the system will obviously also be 
influenced by what is left in and out of the denominator or population. Hence, we should be 
very cautious in drawing strong conclusions about differences over time being due to 
changing features rather than possible artifacts of our measures and definitions. In this 
instance, it is difficult to ascertain the specific consequences of the restrictive definition of 
states, since we do not have supplementary data on military capabilities for states not included 
in the COW list. However, in principle this could be investigated empirically.  
 
15 Vasquez (1993) provides a thoughtful discussion of criticism and subsequent reevaluation. 
 19
We turn instead to another area where it is much easier to demonstrate denominator 
effects,  the question of the prevalence of democracy in the world. Huntington (1991) and 
others have suggested a wave-like pattern in the expansion and contraction of democracy in 
the world. Some international relations researchers have examined how such changes in the 
share of democracies either globally or regionally is associated with changes in conflict and 
peace (see, e.g., Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003). Figure 
3 shows a plot of the proportion of independent states with a score of 6 or above on the  
POLITY democracy scale (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). This does indeed suggest a pattern of 
three waves of democracy, followed by two waves of reversals. 
Figure 3 is based on using the number of states in the denominator. We already know 
from Figure 1 that the number of states in the international system is not constant, but has 
increased rapidly with the decline of larger empires and the process of emancipation of former 
colonies. If the denominator n is not constant, then the share of democracies could decline, 
even if we have no actual reversals from democracy to autocracy. More problematically, the 
types of states that have been added to the system with de-colonialization are likely to be very 
different from long-established states, and typically have much lower levels of economic 
development or human capital. For example, in studies of economic openness over time, 
Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2003) show that normalizing by the changing number of 
states suggests a declining degree of interconnectedness. However, this is due to changes in 
the type of state in the population rather than a decline in trade between existing states. 
Similarly, few previous colonies start out as democracies, but are likely to emerge with 
autocratic institutions. Doorenspleet (2000) holds that much of the apparent evidence for 
waves of democratization is due to changes in the system rather than changes between 
democracy and autocracy in state institutions. 
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Figure 3: The proportion of democratic states 
 
In Figure 3 all states have equal weight. However, some states carry more weight in 
international politics than others. For example, the regime type of India and China is much 
more significant both for conflict and global demonstration effects than the status of Tonga 
and Palau. One possibility would be to weight countries by some measure of their relative 
share, for example population, as shown in Figure 4. This suggests a much higher level for the 
second wave than the proportion of states in Figure 3, reflecting the fact that India and other 
large states are accorded more weight than smaller states. However, Figure 4 does not indicate 
a dramatically different picture in terms of the waves of democracy. 
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Figure 4: Share of democracies, weighting states by population 
 
A more subtle issue that has received little attention so far is that if we are interested in 
the extent to which the world is democratic, then it is not obvious that we want to limit the 
denominator to the part living in independent states. The principle of the right of national self-
determination is very much a post-1945 phenomenon, and the further back in time we go, a 
substantial share of the world’s population will be in dependent areas or colonies, under the 
control of other states. As we have shown above, when the denominator increases as former 
colonies become independent, we will get an increase in the number of non-democratic 
independent states. However, since the populations in these areas were previously living 
under non-democratic colonial rule, it is misleading to argue that autocracy is becoming 
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widespread simply because these areas now have independent autocratic states as opposed to 
colonial non-democratic administration. 
Unlike many other forms of data that are only collected for state-like units, it is 
possible to get estimates for world population (or estimates by region), including individuals 
living in colonies and dependent areas. Hence, we can get a better measure of the extent of 
democracy in the world by looking at the share of population living in democratic states over 
the total global population. Using expanded population data collected by (Gleditsch 2004a),  
Figure 5  suggests that there was a real setback for democracy in the period leading up to 
World War II. However, this is the only major period of democratic setback over the two last 
centuries. Even the decolonization period emerges as a static period, where democracy does 
not expand, rather than a retrenchment. According to these estimates, it is only around the 
turn of the millennium that a majority of the world’s population live under democratic 
institutions.  
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Figure 5: Share of world population living under democratic rule 
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 The large denominator effects shown here imply quite different conclusions about the 
frequency and changes in democratic institutions. Our point to emphasize how conclusions in 
analyses on war and peace can be influenced by denominator effects or non-random missing 
data rather than arguing that one measure is inherently superior to another. The main lesson is  
that scholars should carefully specify empirical measures that actually correspond to their 
concept of interest rather than uncritically use what is most readily available.  
 
Recommendations for future research 
Our discussion so far has generally had a pessimistic tone, pointing to potential problems 
arising in data collection.  This is not to be construed as an argument for abandoning 
empirical work and reverting to arm-chair theorizing. Data collection in international relations 
has indisputably facilitated a great deal of valuable systematic research. In numerous 
instances widely shared beliefs about alleged trends have been refuted by  systematic data. 
Prominent examples here include the alleged more dangerous nature of the post-Cold War 
world, as well as the extreme fears over the alleged global erosion of democracy expressed in 
the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Revel 1984; see also the interesting review in Mueller 1994: 362). 
Despite these successes, greater attention to problems in data collection and interpretation is 
important in its own right, and essential for advancing research on conflict and peace. In this 
section, we try to provide a more positive contribution with some practical recommendations 
on how data collection efforts ought to proceed. 
First, the distinction between subjective and objective measures often is overstated. 
Leaving aside the question of content validity, most seemingly objective criteria (e.g., 
numbers of people killed) tend ultimately to rely on various subjective and potentially 
controversial judgments. The more serious problem plaguing many international relations data 
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collection efforts is that so little documentation is available detailing the specific judgments 
and sources going into the production of the data. The Correlates of War (COW) war data, for 
example, provide no documentation on the specific sources used to determine whether 
conflicts meet their battledeath criteria and why codings change, beyond some discussion of 
how their original data were compiled from existing data sources (e.g., Singer and Small 
1972; Small and Singer 1982). Likewise, very little information has been available on coding 
of the MID disputes data, making it difficult for users to figure out what the events included 
actually may refer to, as well as what sources were used in coding the event.16 By contrast, 
although the ICB data may be criticized for relying on subjective judgments on perceptions, 
the ICB project has been quite explicit in documenting the rationale for their classifications 
(see e.g., the extensive case summaries in Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). Information on 
decisions and sources/origins of coding allows users to inspect these for individual 
observations in order to determine whether these are relevant for their particular research 
question or not.17 
Second, data collection efforts should be much more explicit about the  uncertainty in 
classifications. Recent data collection efforts by Lacina et al. (2006) and Valentino (2004), for 
example, provide a range of estimates for casualty numbers, which are very helpful in 
providing  a sense of the uncertainty surrounding some of even the best guesses. Morrow 
(2007) similarly codes not only the degree of compliance with laws of war, but also the 
 
16 Effort to identify additional information about the events in the MID data by Schultz reveal that it was difficult 
to find information about many of the events in the MID data. In some instances, the only source for the 
militarized events appears to be statements from the alleged target of the action, with the initiating state denying 
that the events has taken place (see Gleditsch et al 2008: 26). This hardly seems consistent with the definition 
provided by Jones et al. (1996) and the emphasis on explicit action.  
17 Other examples of data with extensive source documentation include Lacina et al. (2006) on battledeaths and 
Vanhanen’s (2000) democracy data. 
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quality of the data and the clarity of non-compliance. By incorporating uncertainty in projects, 
the collector allows future users to understand when the indicators involve more subjective 
judgment and help to flag decisions that other researches may disagree with or exclude from 
their own analyses. 
Third, expert opinion surveys can help to limit the impact that a single person’s 
judgment has on the final resulting data. An early example of an expert-based survey is 
Goldstein’s (1992) development of a cooperation-conflict index based on the WEIS event 
data scores. To create the scale, Goldstein had to assign values related to the level of 
cooperation or conflict involved in such events as “deny negotiations” and “promise military 
support.” Instead of relying exclusively on his own best guesses, Goldstein surveyed 
international relations experts and had them assign values to each of the possible events. 
Goldstein then found the means and standard deviations around each of the assigned values 
and used these to construct the conflict-cooperation scale for the categories. In this way, 
Goldstein was able to reduce the influence that a single coder’s biases can have on the 
resulting classifications, and the reported measures of uncertainty allow the user of the data to 
incorporate the uncertainty around these values. More recently, Baum and Groeling 
(forthcoming) polled international security experts to create an estimate for the degree to 
which the US was succeeding or failing in Iraq during various time periods. Cederman, 
Girardin, and Wimmer (2006) have conducted an ethnic survey of the political status of 
different ethnic groups using an internet-based platform that records the individual users 
rankings and the full revision history of the data. This approach provides an excellent way of 
making the coding transparent and allowing interested readers access to decisions that go into 
the data. 
Finally, although much of data collection efforts in international relations have 
emphasized collecting data for the entire population or system, in many instances a targeted, 
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smaller data collection strategy might be a more cost-effective way to expand our knowledge 
(e.g., King and Zeng 2000). Owing to the predominance in systemic arguments in the 
discipline at the outset of the behavioral revolution, it is not surprising that early data-
collection efforts sought to classify information for the international system at large. But as 
our discipline has increasingly turned to evaluating dyadic propositions, scholars now attempt 
explanations based on variation in dyadic rather than systemic characteristics. Elementary 
statistics courses are designed to teach us that making generalizations to a population does not 
require that we have data on the full population, and that much information can be gleaned 
from a random sample. If data are difficult to collect for a full population, then we will often 
be much better off trying to track down good information on a smaller sample while ensuring 
that we minimize bias in the information collected. 
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